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THE ARIKARA INDIANS AND THE 
MISSOURI RIVER TRADE: 
A QUEST FOR SURVIVAL 
ROGER L. NICHOLS 
B y the time the United States acquired most 
of the Great plains through the Louisiana Pur-
chase, many Indians of the upper Missouri 
River valley had encountered French, British, 
and Anglo-American fur traders in their home-
land. Most Native Americans in that region 
seem to have welcomed the manufactured 
goods these intruders brought, but at the same 
time some objected to the whites' disruption 
of earlier trade patterns. Nearly all of the 
Missouri Valley tribes appear to have disliked 
some aspects of the fur and hide trade, and 
many violent incidents occurred. As a village-
dwelling tribe located along the Missouri River 
in South Dakota, the Arikara Indians could not 
avoid participation in the existing trade activ-
ities or the violence that seemed to grow out 
of them. 
Although limited in numbers and hemmed 
in by often hostile neighboring tribes, these 
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Arizona, Roger L. Nichols has written exten-
sively on the military history of the American 
West. His most recent book is Stephen Long 
and American Frontier Exploration (1980), 
co-authored with Patrick L. HaUey. 
77 
people proved difficult partners for European, 
American, and Indian traders of the early 
nineteenth century. Between the 1790s and 
the smallpox epidemic of 1837 the Arikaras 
launched sporadic raids and attacks against 
other Indians as well as white traders who 
passed their villages. In doing so they were 
little different from their Sioux or Pawnee 
neighbors. Nevertheless, because of their ac-
tions traders and government officials con-
sidered them to be unpredictable and often 
dangerous. This view became so widespread 
that nearly every historical discussion of the 
early Missouri Valley and Rocky Mountain fur 
trade comments on Arikara hostility. In fact, 
most modern. historians merely echo early 
nineteenth-century criticism of the Arikaras 
as ~apricious and "savage" people, basing this 
characterization on the fur trade accounts from 
that era.! 
Such an interpretation tends to obscure a 
better understanding of Arikara actions and 
motivations. Certainly the tribe was uncoop-
erative and, at times, dangerous to the traders. 
Yet the basis for negative comments about the 
villagers often grew from other causes. As 
Lewis .Saum has pointed out, white views of 
particular tribes depended upon psychological 
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FIG. 1. The location of tribes in the upper Mis-
souri River valley about 1830. 
and economic factors that might bear only a 
slight relationship to the Indians' specific ac-
tions. For example, he notes that the two tribes 
with the worst reputations among the traders, 
the Blackfeet and the Arikaras, contributed 
almost nothing to the fur trade in general or to 
the profits of individual traders in particular. 
Of the two, the Arikaras lived in a region that 
offered few beaver or other fur-bearing animals. 
At the same time, the villagers were not partic-
ularly ambitious or successful hunters, so they 
had few pelts or buffalo robes on which the 
traders could make a profit. 2 Certainly the 
Arikaras's lack of effective participation in the 
Missouri River fur and hide trade supports 
Saum's contention. 
Saum offers several other reasons why 
traders might view an Indian society negative-
ly. Whites tended to consider hunting groups 
as ambitious and noble, and looked down on 
those groups who were farmers or fishermen. 
Unfortunately for the Arikaras, they were both 
farmers and fishermen, and did only a little 
hunting. Related to this issue was the posses-
sion of horses. As a nearly sedentary village 
tribe, the Arikaras never acquired large horse 
herds. Indians with few horses somehow 
seemed less impressive than the mounted tribes-
men of the plains. The Arikara reputation also 
suffered because of negative comments about 
their society that were expressed by lonely, 
frustrated, and fearful traders living among 
them.3 If Saum is correct, and each of these 
factors played a part in establishing negative 
images about any tribe, then the Arikaras 
were indeed damned. 
On the other hand, intratribal issues cer-
tainly help to explain how and why the Ari-
karas, a tribe of perhaps only two thousand 
people, came to exercise a prominent role in 
upper Missouri Valley affairs. Their experience 
provides a clear example of the intricate nature 
of intertribal and Indian-white relations result-
ing from the fur trade, the destructive impact 
of white traders upon the tribes, and the ac-
tions of people representing the United States 
government. Much of the occasional Arikara 
hostility toward whites developed because 
of misunderstandings by Indians and whites 
alike. Little specific evidence of the nature 
and functioning of Arikara village life has sur-
vived, so it is difficult, at best, to assign Indian 
motivations. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
Arikaras acted as they did in response to real 
and perceived grievances, and not merely be-
cause they chose to be difficult. The tribe faced 
serious problems, and the way they dealt with 
them brought the Indians into direct conflict 
with the American fur trading community in 
the Missouri Valley. 
THE ARIKARAS AND 
THEIR NEIGHBORS 
Archeologists suggest that the predecessors 
of the Arikaras came from the Central Plains 
Tradition, which developed in Kansas, Nebras-
ka, and western Iowa. There, living in small, 
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unfortified villages along the creeks and rivers, 
they supported themselves through hunting 
and agriculture. 4 Related to, or a branch of, 
the Skidi Pawnees, these Caddoan people mi-
grated north and east, settling between the 
Elkhorn and the Missouri rivers in eastern 
Nebraska. Although the chronology for their 
migrations remains uncertain, scholars agree 
that by the eighteenth century Arikara terri-
tory stretched northward from northeastern 
Nebraska into the region between the Bad and 
Cheyenne rivers in central South Dakota. 5 
Among the Arikaras the events of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries brought a de-
crease in numbers and a reduced area of habita-
tion. These events both caused and resulted 
from basic alterations in the villagers' society 
and economy. The most important regional 
development was the Arikaras' increasing par-
ticipation in the Indian trade network that 
stretched from Hudson's Bay in Canada south 
to Santa Fe, and from Iowa and Minnesota 
west to the Rocky Mountains or even beyond. 
The earliest discernible trade pattern in the 
upper Missouri Valley consisted of exchanging 
surplus aboriginal items. Hunting groups such 
as the Yankton and Teton Dakotas from the 
east and the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Comanche, 
and Kiowa tribes from the plains to the west 
and south brought their excess meat, hides, and 
clothing to barter with the agricultural villagers 
for corn, beans, pumpkins, and tobacco. Grad-
ually the trade encouraged both hunters and 
farmers to specialize in order to have surplus 
meats and grains for barter. As the trade 
developed, the Arikaras and other Missouri 
Valley tribes came to depend less on their own 
hunting and more on their neighbors' efforts 
to meet their needs for meat and hides. 6 
During the late seventeenth century the Ari-
karas and their neighbors moved into the 
second stage or pattern of trade, which in-
cluded the continued exchange of purely 
Indian goods but also incorporated European 
trade goods, in particular the horse and the 
gun. The tribes of the Southern Plains brought 
horses into the Missouri Valley and traded these 
animals for guns, ammunition, and manu-
factured goods from Canada, which the vil-
lagers got through the Assiniboins and Sioux. 
Only a few decades after this change occurred, 
French traders moving south out of Canada 
ushered in the last stage in the Indian trade-
direct commerce with the whites by the Mis-
souri Valley tribes. 7 
By the late eighteenth century, the Arikara 
economy included several diverse elements. As 
agricultural people they raised corn, beans, 
pumpkins, and other food crops-not only for 
their own use, but for trade with the nearby 
hunting tribes. In return for acting as partial 
food suppliers for their neighbors, the Ari-
karas expected and needed to receive meat, 
hides, leather goods, and clothing. Their eco-
nomic efforts were not limited, however, to 
serving as crop producers and a market for the 
products of the hunt. In addition, they con-
tinued their significant role as middlemen 
between the Southern Plains tribes, who had 
access to Spanish trade goods and horses, and 
the tribes of the region between the Mississippi 
and Missouri River valleys, who contributed 
guns and ammunition received from French, 
and later British, Canada. The Arikaras also 
competed directly with other northern tribes 
by hunting the buffalo at least once each year. 8 
Although their combination of agriculture, 
trade, and hunting gave them a balanced econ-
omy, these activities often brought the Ari-
karas into conflict with other Indians. Of all 
their neighbors, the Sioux caused the most 
trouble. Perhaps they objected to giving the 
village traders any profits. Certainly they dis-
liked having Arikara hunting parties enter their 
territory. For whatever reasons, the Sioux dis-
liked and looked down on these village dwellers. 
According to . the trader Tabeau, the Sioux 
acted as if the villagers were "a certain kind of 
serf, who cultivates for them and who, as they 
say, takes, for them, the place of women." 
So domineering were the Sioux that their visits 
to the Arikara villages might also be described 
as peaceful raiding expeditions. They went far 
beyond simple trading. They set the prices for 
their meat and hides, took what they wanted 
from the villagers, pillaged Arikara gardens and 
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fields, stole horses, beat and insulted the Ari-
kara women, and destroyed their grazing 
fields-all with little fear of reprisal. 9 In con-
trast, the Mandan and Hidatsa villagers, living 
perhaps one hundred miles farther north, were 
just far enough away to escape most of the 
intensity and frequency of Sioux molestation 
that the Arikara experienced every summer. 
Occasionally they even joined forces to raid the 
Arikaras themselves when they were not trying 
to maintain an anti-Sioux alliance among the 
village peoples. 
Indian hostility, however, was only one 
factor in the series of difficulties the Arikaras 
faced. Floods, drought, and grasshoppers posed 
a threat to both their crops and their livelihood 
as traders. Depleted soil and a nearly continual 
shortage of wood forced the Indians to move 
their villages every few years. Sometime after 
their early contacts with European traders, 
the villagers suffered as many as three major 
smallpox epidemics, which nearly destroyed 
the tribe. Existing sources are unclear, but 
they differ only on the timing of the epidemics 
and the size of the Arikara losses. All agree that 
by the 1790s most of these Indians had died or 
fled their Missouri Valley homes. The French-
man J ean-Baptiste Truteau wrote that, although 
the tribe inhabited only two villages in 1795, 
"in ancient times the Ricara nation was very 
large; it counted thirty-two populous villages, 
now depopulated and almost entirely destroyed 
by smallpox. . . . A few families only, from 
each of the villages, escaped; these united and 
formed the two villages now here.,,10 When 
Lewis and Clark visited the Arikaras in 1804, 
another French trader, Pierre-Antoine Tabeau, 
reported that the three villages then inhabited 
were all that remained of some eighteen vil-
lages that had stretched along both sides of 
the Missouri in South Dakota. 11 
The ravages of smallpox and continuing 
Sioux raids led the surviving Arikaras to con-
solidate in two or three villages, but this change 
brought unforeseen difficulties as well. The 
remaining towns included people from at least 
ten identifiable bands with many differences, 
including linguistic ones. From the abandoned 
villages and existing bands, many chiefs seem to 
have survived. According to the trader Tabeau, 
there were more than forty-two chiefs in the 
three towns. Each chief, he reported, "wishes 
at least to have followers and tolerates no form 
of dependence" on other leaders in the villages. 
The many divisions made the Arikaras "infinite-
ly more unhappy" than other tribes in the 
region.12 Such internal rivalries and factional-
ism resulted in bitter quarrels, Tabeau reported. 
On occasion the chiefs and their followers 
robbed and even threatened to fight each 
other.13 The lack of clearly defined village or 
tribal leadership created a dangerous instabil-
ity, which in turn made dealing with outsid-
ers, either Indian or white, difficult. For exam-
ple, as early as 1805 it was clear that the 
Arikaras neither could nor would subordinate 
what seemed to be minor differences for their 
mutual benefit. Tabeau noted that even though 
they realized that it was imperative to keep 
peace with the Mandan villagers to the north 
if they were to be able to survive the Sioux 
onslaught, they could not do so. Denouncing 
their "internal and destructive quarrels," he 
reported that all efforts to end the fighting with 
the Mandans had failed. "Individual jealousy," 
he claimed, disrupted "all of the plans which 
tend to bring about peace.,,14 
In addition to the fragmented nature of Ari-
kara society, at least one other important factor 
affected the villagers' relations with outsiders. 
Warfare was of substantial importance in gain-
ing local status and wealth, and the nature of 
Indian raids and campaigns kept the surround-
ing region in nearly constant turmoil. When an 
individual decided to go to war or to lead a 
raiding party, he issued a call for followers. 
Once his party was organized, they left to raid, 
rob, or fight. If they had to return home 
without success, they "'cast their robes,' as 
they express it, and vow to kill the first person 
they meet, provided he be not of their own 
nation. ,,15 This practice goes a long way 
toward explaining incidents that otherwise 
seem to make little or no sense. Certainly the 
Arikaras were not the only Indians to make 
such attacks, but they appear to have focused 
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their wrath on white travelers and traders more 
often than some of their neighbors did. 
In March, 1804, Meriwether Lewis and wil-
liam Clark participated in the transfer of 
Louisiana to the United States. Although the 
Arikara villagers knew nothing of the event, 
it would have many consequences for them. 
In the long run it meant that increasing num-
bers of American fur traders and trappers 
moving up the Missouri Valley from Saint 
Louis would replace French and English traders 
from the north and east. The resulting shift in 
trade would change the village tribes' lives 
permanently, and would put more strain on 
their relations with the Sioux. 
RELATIONS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES, 1804-l3 
By the time Lewis and Clark reached them 
on October 8,1804, the Arikaras dwelt in three 
villages just above the mouth of the Grand 
River in northern South Dakota. One of these 
was on an island some three miles north of the 
Grand, while the others stood on the west 
bank of the Missouri another four miles up-
stream. The explorers reported signs that the 
Arikaras had only recently abandoned another 
village farther to the south. To them the settle-
ments seemed calm. In fact the Lewis and Clark 
visit was one of several during which the tribes-
men seemed genuinely pleased to have Amer-
icans visit them. The villagers welcomed the 
Americans pleasantly from the start. Sergeant 
John Ordway noted their friendly reception 
and the relaxed atmosphere of the towns re-
peatedly. He wrote that the Indians "were all 
friendly & Glad to See us," and reported that 
the soldiers moved from one of the towns to 
another, where they received similar welcomes 
and kind treatment. During their five-day stay 
among the Arikaras, the exploring party moved 
about the villages freely, visited and ate in 
numerous Indian lodges, gave presents and 
trade goods to some leaders at each of the 
towns, and apparently had no problems with 
these Indians whatsoever. 16 
If the Lewis and Clark experience with these 
villagers had been the prototype for the recep-
tion other Americans experienced later, there 
would have been little reason to fear Arikara 
hostility, but that was not the case. The explor-
ers did several things that later made friendly 
relations with these Indians difficult. First, they 
pushed their way past the Teton Sioux only a 
few days before reaching the Arikaras. By doing 
so they broke the attempted blockade of the 
upper Missouri by the Sioux. From that time 
on, men traveling along the Missouri would 
usually pass or trade with the Sioux rather than 
fight them. This disrupted the economic pat-
terns among the Indians. Now the Arikaras 
and other villagers of the upper river valley 
were considerably less dependent upon the 
Sioux or Canadians because they could get 
some goods from Saint Louis. Americans who 
followed the famous explorers up the river 
came into direct competition with the Indian 
traders. This increased the bad feelings between 
the Sioux and the villagers. 
During their brief stop among the Arikaras, 
Lewis and Clark did two other things that 
caused trouble within the tribe and between 
the villagers and the Americans later. First, as 
was their practice, they recognized one princi-
pal chief in each town. Given the splintered 
leadership among these Indians, that act proba-
bly angered village rivals. Second, and probably 
more important, the explorers convinced the 
Arikaras that one of their village leaders should 
accompany a deputation of other Missouri 
Valley Indians back east to Washington. Chief 
Ankedoucharo volunteered. The delegation 
reached Saint Louis in May, 1805, but did not 
actually travel to Washington until early the 
next year. There, in April, 1806, several Indians, 
including Ankedoucharo, died. 17 The chief's 
continued absence upset the villagers, and they 
responded angrily to the news of his death, 
abusing the trader Joseph Gravelines when he 
reported it to them in early 1807. Obviously 
the explorers had no idea that their brief five-
day stay would set into motion events that 
would change Arikara history. The shifting 
trading patterns would have come anyway, 
just more slowly. However, their presents to 
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some, but not all, village chiefs undoubtedly 
stirred existing animosities within the villages 
and certainly did nothing to ensure continuing 
peace with these people. In encouraging the 
chief Ankedoucharo to leave his village and go 
to Washington, the explorers were simply 
unlucky. When the chief died, the Indians ap-
parently thought that he had been killed in the 
United States. 
Revenge played an important role in the 
Arikara culture, and their anger toward the 
whites was evident in 1807 when the Saint 
Louis trader Manuel Lisa stopped at their 
villages. The Indians appeared hostile from the 
start. Several hundred warriors lined the river 
banks, and after some shooting, they ordered 
the traders ashore. Lisa convinced the villagers 
to trade rather than fight, but the situation was 
anything but friendly when he pushed on up-
stream. 18 
The Arikaras were further antagonized by 
American efforts to help the Mandan chief 
Shahaka return to his village, located upstream 
on the Missouri above Arikara territory. Like 
Ankedoucharo, Shahaka had gone east for a 
visit to Washington. In May, 1807, Ensign 
Nathaniel Pryor led the chief up the Missouri 
with an escort of fourteen soldiers and twenty-
three fur traders. When Pryor's party reached 
the lower Arikara village, the Indians appeared 
sullen. Nevertheless, after a short speech Pryor 
and his men left for the upper villages. There 
the warriors attacked his two boats. The sur-
prised whites exchanged shots with the Arikaras 
and drifted back downstream out of range. 
Three of the traders died outright and a fourth 
died from his wounds later. Rather than try to 
push upstream immediately, Pryor took his 
force and Chief Shahaka back downstream to 
Saint Louis. Two years passed before the 
Mandan chief returned safely to his village. 19 
There were several reasons for the Arikara 
attack on Pryor's expedition, and certainly not 
all of them were clear at the time. The ensign 
blamed Manuel Lisa for his disaster, charging 
that Lisa had so much trouble with the Arikaras 
that summer that the trader sought "to divert 
the storm which threatened his own boat, 
by diverting the attention of the Ricaras to 
ours.,,20 He claimed that the trader had pro-
vided the Indians with guns and ammunition 
and that Lisa had persuaded the villagers that 
Pryor's boats would carry plenty of trade 
goods, but the latter was not the case. If the 
Indians thought that Pryor's boats included 
large amounts of trade goods, they might have 
seen his move beyond their towns as a plan to 
bypass them and to trade directly with the 
tribes of the interior. This would directly affect 
the Arikara economy. 
Even if the villagers did not see the Ameri-
cans as an economic threat, other factors were 
important in the attack. American officials 
appear not to have considered the endemic 
warfare between the upper Missouri Valley 
tribes a problem: in this case it was. The Ari-
karas and Mandans were actively at war with 
each other during the summer of 1807, when 
Ensign Pryor's flotilla arrived with the Mandan 
chief Shahaka aboard. To make matters worse, 
the Arikaras had learned of Chief Ankedou-
charo's death only a few months earlier and had 
not been appeased. Having stirred Arikara 
anger by being responsible for the death of one 
of their chiefs, the Americans now appeared, 
escorting Mandan chief Shah aka, a leader of 
their enemies.21 It should not be surprising 
that the villagers launched their assault. 
The Arikara response to Pryor's 1807 expe-
dition caused American officials to be more 
careful two years later when they escorted Man-
dan chief Shah aka back to his village a second 
time. The government hired the newly formed 
Missouri Fur Company to provide at least 
120 armed men for the task. Such a force was 
clearly unnecessary for anything except the 
need to return the Mandan chief and to in-
hibit attacks by Indians. Just south of the 
first Arikara village, the escort landed and 
marched along the river toward the village. 
The large party of obviously armed men ap-
proaching their town frightened the Indians. 
They met their visitors reluctantly, listened 
to speeches denouncing their past violence, 
and promised to remain friendly to the whites 
in the future. After the meeting, the whites left 
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FIG. 2. The main Arikara village on the Missouri as it appeared to George Catlin in 1832. 
men behind to conduct trade on a regular basis 
and then pushed on up the river to the Mandan 
villages. 22 
At this point the Arikaras posed no greater 
threat than did other tribes along the Missouri, 
and they certainly caused less fear among the 
traders than did the Sioux. The latter tribe had 
threatened to prevent Lewis and Clark from 
passing up the river in 1804, and some bands 
menaced Manuel Lisa's party in the summer of 
1809. Later that same year the Sioux stopped 
Ramsay Crooks and Robert McClellan, forcing 
them to build a trading post along the river for 
the tribe. When the warriors returned to their 
villages to get furs for trade, the Americans fled 
back downriver. Reports of Indian depreda-
tions reaching Saint Louis in late 1809 indi-
cated that all of the Sioux and most other 
tribes except the Arikaras and Mandans were 
hostile to the whites. 23 Whether this report 
was accurate or not, it indicates that the Ari-
karas still retained a reputation as being cooper-
ative most of the time. 
Little changed during the next year, and by 
the summer of 1811, when Wilson P. Hunt 
and Manuel Lisa both led men up the Missouri, 
they seemed much more worried about the 
Sioux than the Arikaras. Once again traders 
traveling downstream had reported that most of 
the Indians along the Missouri, except "the 
Mandans, Arikaras, and one or two small 
tribes" were hostile to the whites. 24 The con-
tinuing rumors of Sioux hostility proved so 
frightening that they had to be suppressed in 
order to get the French boatmen to continue 
as employees of the fur company parties that 
year. When Hunt's men encountered the Sioux, 
they feared an all-out battle, but careful talks 
avoided bloodshed. Manuel Lisa, then racing up 
the Missouri in pursuit of Hunt's party, also 
talked his way past the dreaded Sioux, but only 
with immediate gifts and the promise that he 
would establish a permanent trading post 
among them later that same year. A few days 
later both groups of traders met a party of 
some three hundred Arikara, Hidatsa, and Man-
dan warriors headed south to attack the Sioux. 
Much to the travelers' relief, these Indians 
decided to escort them safely upstream to their 
villages instead.25 In this case the Arikaras 
strove to protect the traders from the Sioux 
because they feared that Sioux attacks might 
force the whites back downriver in the same 
manner that Crooks and McClellan had fled 
just two years earlier. If that happened, the up-
river villages would be cut off from their 
anticipated trade goods. 
Once the traders reached their villages in 
safety, however, the Arikaras strove to manipu-
late the situation for their own advantage. They 
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announced that they would not trade with 
their visitors or even permit them to go farther 
up the river unless the Americans agreed to 
leave some trade goods and a resident trader 
at their villages. Manuel Lisa agreed to meet 
these terms and even persuaded the Indians to 
sell horses to Hunt's party, then on its way to 
the Pacific Northwest. This appears to have 
satisfied the chiefs, and they said nothing more 
about trying to prevent the whites from con-
. . £ h h 26 tmumg art er nort or west. 
During the following week, June 12-19, 
1811, the members of Lisa's and Hunt's groups 
camped across the Missouri from the Arikara 
villages. They traded for horses, bought cloth-
ing and food, visited Indian lodges, and lounged 
around their hosts' settlements. During that 
time the whites moved about with no hindrance 
from the Indians and, in fact, were offered 
the usual Indian-style welcome and hospitality. 
At no time did there seem to be any danger of 
hostilities, and the first day Chief Left Hand 
even provided Indian guards for the whites' 
camp to keep the villagers away from the trad-
ers' camp and to limit the thievery that might 
occur. By the time theirwee.k-Iong visit ended, 
Hunt's party had gotten at least thirty horses, 
and Lisa sent some of his employees north to 
the Mandan villages to get some more. The 
traders seem to have had little fear that their 
Indian hosts might harm them, and apparently 
enjoyed their stay among the Arikaras that 
June. According to Henry Brackenridge, the 
Arikaras had remained "friendly to the whites" 
since the "unfortunate affair of lieutenant 
Prior [sic]." He claimed that the tribesmen 
had tried to keep on the good side of the 
whites after the 1809 show of force against 
them, and that they expressed "much regret" 
over the incident. Arikara protestations of 
innocence and efforts to blame the incident on 
a "bad chief" who refused to accept the group 
decision to remain at peace brought little sym-
pathy from Brackenridge. 27 Nevertheless, given 
the splintered nature of village society and 
tribal leadership, they may have been telling 
the truth. 
Regardless of whether a disaffected splinter 
group had been responsible for the unprovoked 
attack in 1807 or not, the whites' peaceful, 
week-long visit at the Arikara villages shows 
several things. First, the Indians' hatred and 
fear of the Sioux to the east and south clearly 
shaped their relations with the intruding whites. 
That explains why the Arikaras had escorted 
the Hunt and Lisa parties the last few miles 
to their towns. Second, and related to this, 
was the Arikaras' perceived need for trade 
goods from the Americans. Despite fears in 
the United States that British traders from the 
Red River settlements had made serious inroads 
in the commerce with the river valley tribes, 
the Indians considered American trade goods 
imperative. They wanted the items for their 
own use and for exchange with neighboring 
tribes as well. Third, the Arikaras proved here 
not only that they recognized the need to re-
main at peace with the traders, but also that 
they could be gracious hosts to the visiting 
Americans. 
Despite their apparent good will the village 
Indians resented their dependence on the 
whites, whose visits and trading posts caused 
frequent incidents and trouble. This is clear 
from Indian actions toward the Americans in 
the summer of 1812. In early August Manuel 
Lisa led another party of traders to the Arikara 
towns. Four days before they reached the vil-
lages, Le Gauche, the "left-handed chief," met 
them briefly. Apparently Lisa gave his visitor 
a present or perhaps several small items before 
the Indian leader returned home. When the 
traders arrived, the Arikaras failed to receive 
them in the same friendly fashion they had 
shown a year earlier. Two of the three princi-
pal chiefs refused to meet with Lisa and people 
in both villages acted strangely. Fearing trouble, 
Lisa took some armed men to the trading post 
and asked the chiefs to explain. In this case 
intratribal rivalries and divisions helped create 
the difficulty. When Le Gauche returned from 
having visited Lisa with a few presents, the 
other chiefs became jealous because nothing 
had been sent along for them. As a result, their 
followers were angry with Lisa. At the same 
time, however, the Arikaras realized that they 
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had brought few furs and buffalo robes to 
barter, and they worried that the whites might 
want to close the unprofitable trading post. 
This is exactly what Lisa hoped to do, but to 
placate the villagers he shifted his operations to 
a location only a few miles north of their 
towns. This move appears to have satisfied the 
chiefs.28 So once again the whites had no major 
difficulty with the Arikaras. 
The situation was different with the Hidatsas 
farther to the north, however. They had recent-
ly killed one of Lisa's men, detained another, 
and stolen twenty-six of the fur company's 
horses, so the trader took a sizable party north 
to deal with them. After Lisa left, John C. 
Luttig remained at the trading post near the 
Arikara villages during the winter of 1812-13. 
He reported that the Indians frequently came 
for trade, supplies, and apparently sometimes 
just to talk. Despite the almost daily contact 
between whites and Indians, the trader re-
corded no major and few minor incidents with 
the Arikaras. In fact, while the traders feared 
both the Sioux and Cheyenne tribes, they ex-
pressed only mild contempt for the Arikaras, 
describing them as a "sett oflying and good for 
nothing fellows." Thus, when Lisa abandoned 
this trading location and took his men, furs, 
and trade goods south down the Missouri in 
March, 1813, his company had suffered little 
at the hands of this tribe-certainly far less than 
from the Sioux and perhaps other groups. 29 
When the Americans retreated down the 
Missouri in 1813, they left the Indians of the 
upper valley dependent upon representatives 
of the British fur trading companies. The Saint 
Louis traders had complained of the influence 
that their competitors from the north exer-
cised over the tribes for years, and with open 
hostilities between the two nations, their fears 
of lost markets and sources of furs multiplied. 
It appeared that some tribes in the region had 
become hostile to Americans, and by the 
summer of 1813 the Missouri Gazette com-
mented that the "Aricaras, Chyans, Grosventre, 
Crows, and Aropahays are or may be consid-
ered at war with the Americans.,,30 There is no 
way to know if this badly spelled list was 
accurate or not, but in view of the traders' 
experience with the Arikaras since 1809 there 
seems to have been little basis for such a 
charge. Certainly the villagers were disap-
pointed and angry at losing their trading post 
and the goods it represented, but there is little 
reason to think that they would not have wel-
comed American traders with enthusiasm had 
they appeared with a fresh supply of trade 
goods. 
WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES. 1823 
There is little information about relations 
with the tribes of the upper Missouri during 
and immediately after the War of 1812. The 
Saint Louis traders associated with Manuel 
Lisa had lost money and withdrawn from the 
company, which later reorganized as Lisa and 
Hunt. This group managed to operate one trad-
ing post among the Omahas in eastern Nebraska 
and a second farther upriver among the Sioux. 
The trading companies shifted partners and 
names rapidly for several years after the war, 
but it seems clear that the Arikaras, Mandans, 
and Hidatsas had no regular contact with Saint 
Louis traders before at least 1818, and even 
that year is not certain.31 All that is clear 
during those years is that the Missouri traders 
did not return to the practice of operating 
year-around, fixed trading posts among the 
villagers of the upper Missouri. 
The lack of a trader living among them or 
near their villages may well have angered the 
Arikaras or even deprived them of much-
needed goods. What is clear is that by 1820 
the Saint Louis traders had moved as far as 
the. Big Bend of the Missouri, perhaps 150 
miles south of the Arikaras. However, that 
year a large war party, reportedly of Arikaras, 
had attacked and robbed two trading posts 
in that region. Since the villagers previously 
had reasonably good relations with Lisa's 
men, it is not possible to determine with 
certainty why they would have attacked the 
traders. Nevertheless, if these traders provided 
the Sioux with guns and ammunition that they 
used to rob and harass the Arikaras, while the 
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latter had no resident traders from whom to get 
similar goods, it should not be surprising that 
they might molest and rob the furmen. 
The 1820 attack on a Missouri Fur Company 
post gave Joshua Pilcher, Lisa's successor in the 
upriver trade, reason to be concerned about 
problems with the Arikaras in 1822 as he 
ascended the Missouri. According to his own 
report several years later, he was surprised 
when the villagers met him pleasantly. Instead 
of fighting they assured him that they wanted 
good relations with the traders, and they prom-
ised not to attack the whites in the future. 
Thus their pattern of response remained similar 
to their earlier relations with traders. As long as 
the Americans brought the much-needed goods 
to their vicinity, and not only to their hated 
Sioux enemies, they seemed ready to remain 
at peace and to deal with the whites. Pilcher 
moved north to the Mandan villages and began 
work on Fort Vanderburgh, a permanent post 
in North Dakota. On his way downstream later 
that year, he eluded what appeared to be an 
Arikara plot to rob his boat.32 
That same year, 1822, William Ashley and 
Andrew Henry moved up the Missouri to open 
large-scale trapping activities in the northern 
Rockies, going into direct competition with 
Indian trappers and threatening the importance 
of those Indians who had served as the middle-
men for decades. Ashley'S party reached the 
Arikaras by early October. There they received 
a pleasant welcome from tribal leaders, who 
asked that a trader be left at their villages per-
manently. Ashley had expected to trade with 
the Arikaras for horses, but his main goal was 
to supply trappers in the mountains and so he 
had neither the goods nor the desire for such a 
long-term trading venture. Hoping to remain 
on good terms with the villagers, he promised 
to send a trading outfit to the Arikaras early 
the next year. Then, after giving the chiefs a 
few presents and trading for horses, the trap-
pers moved on up the river. 33 Once again a 
group of whites had visited the Arikaras in 
peace and apparently had received reasonable 
treatment from these Indians. Nevertheless, 
Ashley's effort to take large numbers of white 
trappers to the Rockies may have upset the 
villagers. They had witnessed small parties of 
men traveling up the river to the mountains 
before, but this time dozens of Americans took 
the place of each single trapper of earlier years. 
In addition, Ashley's lack of trade goods did 
little to placate Indian feelings because the 
Arikara needed such items. 
Trouble began in March, 1823, when a war 
party of Arikaras met some Missouri Fur 
Company traders accompanying a few Sioux 
and carrying furs and hides gathered by that 
tribe. The Arikaras demanded that the whites 
surrender the hated Sioux to them. When 
the traders refused, they were beaten and 
robbed. This action must be understood as 
primarily anti-Sioux rather than anti-white, 
because the villagers had been on reasonably 
good terms with the traders for some years. 
In this case the whites had interposed them-
selves between parties of Indians who hated 
each other. Nevertheless, the incident may also 
have indicated a growing Arikara anger and 
frustration with the traders. The closest trad-
ing posts stood more than 150 miles to the 
south in Sioux country and nearly 100 miles 
north at the Mandan villages, and despite 
Ashley's promise the preceding autumn, the 
villagers still had no trading post of their 
own. 
Just a few days after the incident, a larger 
force of Arikara braves launched an unsuccess-
ful attack, against Cedar Fort, the Missouri 
Fur Company post just north of the White 
River. In the fighting at least two of the attack-
ers died and several others were wounded. 
One account reported that the angry warriors 
. h h' 34 Th' swore vengeance agamst t e w Ites. IS 
would make sense if, as another account sug-
gests, the traders at Cedar Fort provoked the 
Arikaras in a move calculated to infuriate them 
and thereby disrupt Ashley'S trading visit later 
that summer.35 That interpretation seems 
questionable, however, because the resident 
traders would have to bear the brunt of local 
hostilities. Regardless of the causes for Ari-
kara hostility, by the summer of 1823, the 
villagers were in no mood for trifling. 
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Ashley's party, consisting of ninety trappers, 
made their way up the Missouri in two keel-
boats and, on May 30, 1823, arrived at the 
villages. They had been warned of the Ari-
karas' actions and were prepared for trouble. 
From the fIrst encounter, divisions in the In-
dian community were apparent to the trappers. 
Chiefs Little Soldier and Grey Eyes met Ashley 
when he landed, but when he invited them to 
visit the whites' boats, only Grey Eyes agreed. 
To Ashley this seemed to be a good sign, be-
cause the chiefs son had been one of those 
killed in the earlier attack on Cedar Fort. If 
he bore no grudge, perhaps all was well. After 
Grey Eyes returned to the villages, he informed 
the whites that the tribe would meet for trade 
the next day.36 During the morning of May 31 
trade commenced, but when the whites got 
about half of the forty horses they needed, the 
Indians demanded muskets and powder. At 
this point the barter stopped. The next morning 
Chief Bear invited Ashley to his lodge for a 
meeting. The Indians treated the. whites pleas-
antly, but before the visitors returned to their 
boats, another chief, Little Soldier, warned 
Ashley that some of the warriors planned to 
attack his party.37 Obviously the villagers could 
not agree whether they should trade or fIght. 
Because their disunity was unclear to the 
whites, it was difficult for Ashley to under-
stand the extent of danger to his party. 
Despite the strained circumstances some of 
the trappers went into two Arikara villages 
looking for women that evening. Sometime 
during the night one of them was killed, and at 
sunrise the next morning the Arikaras attacked. 
Within a short time most of the horses had been 
killed or wounded, and many of the trappers 
who had camped on the riverbank to guard 
them had been shot too. In the fIghting Ash-
ley's party suffered twenty-four casualties, of 
whom thirteen died.38 This was the worst 
disaster of the fur trade to that time. 
While Ashley'S defeated party nursed their 
wounded, some of his men hurried downstream 
to Fort Atkinson, just north of Omaha. There 
news of the Arikara victory set efforts to 
punish the Indians into motion. Colonel Henry 
FIG. 3. A typical Arikara brave, Pah-too-ca-ra 
(He Who Strikes). By George Catlin, 1832. 
Leavenworth mobilized most of the troops 
under his command at the post, while Joshua 
Pilcher gathered an auxiliary force of nearly 
sixty traders and fur company employees to 
assist him. On June 22, Colonel Leavenworth 
led his six companies of infantrymen north 
up the Missouri. As the so-called Missouri 
Legion moved upstream, both Pilcher and 
Indian agent Benjamin O'Fallon told Colonel 
Leavenworth that it was imperative for his 
force to defeat the Arikaras if the fur trade 
along the Missouri were to continue.39 
While the troops marched toward the Ari-
kara villages, Pilcher recruited up to 750 
warriors from several Sioux bands along the 
river. On August 9, the motley assortment 
of soldiers, trappers, riverboatmen, and In-
dians reached the Arikara towns. The mounted 
Siou:x; preceded the whites and attacked the 
villagers while Colonel Leavenworth formed 
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his battle line. Once the Arikara braves saw 
Leavenworth's troops, they broke off the fight 
and fled to their villages. The next morning 
the soldiers attacked with their two artillery 
pieces, but most of their shots flew harmlessly 
over the towns and landed in the river. By late 
afternoon, August 10, it was clear that the 
whites had to take decisive action. Their Sioux 
allies had begun to drift away, unimpressed 
with the white man's warfare. The defenders 
clung stubbornly to their villages, and the 
infantry and artillery tactics employed to that 
time had been completely ineffective.40 
Colonel Leavenworth decided to launch an 
infantry attack on the upper village but then 
changed his mind. He feared that the Sioux 
might return and attack his worn troops if they 
failed to breach the Arikara defenses. By this 
time the Arikaras decided to try negotiating 
and met the colonel and Pilcher. Once again 
confusion over village leadership made nego-
tiations difficult. The Indians claimed that 
Chief Grey Eyes, now dead, had been to blame 
for the attack on Ashley's party, and they 
begged for peace. The colonel demanded that 
they restore Ashley's property, replace the 
stolen and killed horses, promise to behave in 
the future, and surrender five hostages. When 
the Indians agreed, Leavenworth decided to 
make peace, much to the disgust and anger of 
the traders. On August 11 Leavenworth wrote a 
treaty that both sides signed. Joshua Pilcher 
denounced the effort to achieve peace and 
threatened the Arikaras with vengeance once 
the soldiers left. Not surprisingly, the Indians 
then refused to turn over the horses to Ashley. 
In fact, they slipped away from their villages on 
the night of August 12 without meeting any of 
the whites' demands. 41 
Most white participants in the 1823 cam-
paign viewed it as a failure because it did not 
punish the Arikaras or regain Ashley's property. 
On the other hand, from the Indians' perspec-
tive it might seem that they had something to 
celebrate. They had successfully defended 
themselves against both the United States and 
their traditional Sioux enemies and then 
escaped without any major punishment. The 
Leavenworth campaign was certainly a mili-
tary failure; however, a more significant point 
is that it set into motion currents that nearly 
destroyed the Arikaras as an independent 
group. Pilcher's men set some of the buildings 
in their two villages afire as soon as the soldiers 
left. The villagers themselves scattered in 
several directions, thus disrupting the delicate 
balance of economic activities through which 
they had supported themselves for several 
generations. 
BECOMING HISTORICAL VILLAINS 
The 1823 attack on Ashley's party estab-
lished the Arikaras' reputation for treachery 
and violence. It was not the first time they had 
attacked whites, and certainly not the last. 
Yet news of their battle and the continuing 
debate among the white participants about 
what could and should have been done to the 
villagers kept their name before the public 
and particularly the fur traders. Prior to the 
1823 incident the Arikaras had behaved no 
worse than most Missouri River tribes, and they 
had a better record than several. Nevertheless, 
they could not escape the notoriety of this 
attack. At the same time they now feared the 
whites as much as their nearby Indian enemies 
and could expect punishment rather than trade 
goods from the Americans. This may be seen 
clearly in their actions during the months after 
the Leavenworth campaign against them. 
When the bitterly divided party of soldiers 
and traders began its journey back down the 
Missouri, some of the villagers moved north up 
the river to within about ten miles of the Man-
dan villages in North Dakota. There they re-
mained a threat to whites along the river, and 
in October, 1823, just a few miles south of the 
Mandan villages, the Arikaras attacked a boat 
of traders, killing its crew of four men and 
plundering the trade goods. A few days later, 
the villagers attacked the Columbia Fur Com-
pany trading post, Tilton's Fort, and later 
that winter they killed one of the resident 
traders.42 
Not all of the Arikaras had fled north up 
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the Missouri; at least one band of some thirty-
eight lodges moved west up the Platte River to 
its junction with the Laramie, where the In-
dians apparently hoped to join the Pawnees 
and avoid American retaliation. In the summer 
of 1824, these people attacked and killed 
several fur traders who stopped at their village 
mistakenly thinking that they were Pawnees. 
Other Arikaras apparently fled to the Pawnee 
towns on the Loup River in east central Ne-
braska, where they remained through 1824. 
Some bands of the displaced villagers remained 
near the Missouri, and by early 1824 some of 
the Indians drifted back to their former vil-
lages and began replanting crops.43 
The continuing uproar over the Arikara 
attack on Ashley's party and colonel Leaven-
worth's ineffective response prompted Congress 
to create an Indian Peace Commission. General 
Henry Atkinson and Indian agent Benjamin 
O'Fallon, the commissioners, were to ascend 
the Missouri River and conclude treaties of 
peace and friendship with the tribes along that 
stream. On Monday, May 16, 1825, the com-
missioners and an escort of nearly five hundred 
soldiers began their journey, and after nearly 
two months, on July 15, they reached the Ari-
kara villages.44 After brief talks the village 
leaders signed the treaty that Atkinson and 
O'Fallon presented them. Because of their past 
hostility, the Arikaras received only a few 
twists of tobacco rather than the swords, 
pistols, ammunition, and trade items given to 
the chiefs of other Missouri Valley tribes. Even 
the minimal present of tobacco seemed to 
satisfy the villagers, however, probably because 
they feared possible attacks by the soldiers. 
Later Atkinson noted optimistically that the 
Indians seemed "impressed with deep and full 
contrision [sic 1 for their offenses" and that 
they promised to "behave well" in the fu-
ture. 45 It is unlikely that this visit had any 
long-range effect upon the Arikaras because the 
villagers remained scattered and because, after 
the subsequent discovery of South Pass, most 
trade goods moved overland hundreds of miles 
south of the Arikara home territory. 
During the years that followed the Atkinson-
O'Fallon expedition, the Arikaras had no other 
major conflict with the whites. Nevertheless, 
they continued to trade and fight with the 
Sioux, Mandans, and Hidatsas and also raided 
white trappers and traders along the Missouri. 
For example, in 1827 the trader James Kipp 
reported that a part of the tribe planned to 
attack and rob the first boats coming up the 
Missouri that year. He thought that they would 
then flee the river. Despite this prediction no 
hostilities occurred that year. In 1829, how-
ever, the Arikaras killed an American Fur Com-
pany employee near one of their villages. The 
next year they struck again, this time killing 
three more traders. Later that same year, 
1830, they robbed an Amercan Fur Company 
party under Kenneth McKenzie.46 
Many of the traders hoped that all the Ari-
karas would leave the river so they would no 
longer have to contend with them. This did not 
happen, however, until after the winter of 
1831-32, and only then because of the con-
tinuing pressure of attack from their Indian 
enemies. Roving bands of Sioux as well as the 
Mandans and Hidatsas raided Arikara villages 
and corn fields repeatedly. At the same time, 
by the end of 1831 the Sioux had disrupted 
Arikara trade with the whites through a virtual 
blockade of the river. At least as important, 
however, were the two natural disasters that 
limited their food supply. First the buffalo 
failed to come close enough for the villagers to 
have a successful hunt that year. Another 
disaster was the failure of their corn crop-the 
one staple that they and some of the neighbor-
ing Indian bands depended upon. When all of 
these problems are considered, it is apparent 
that their move to the Loup River of Nebraska 
during 1832 was no spur-of-the-moment deci-
sion based on a desire to escape the vengeance 
of angry white traders.47 It was rather the 
result of a series of major disasters that oc-
curred within a brief time span and from which 
there was little recourse except to relocate. 
. By the time most of the tribe had moved 
away from the Missouri, the Arikaras were 
reported to have sworn "death and destruction 
to every white man who comes in their way." 
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George Catlin, traveling downriver in the sum-
mer of 1832, noted that originally the villagers 
had received most whites kindly and that their 
hostility resulted from the "system of trade, 
and the manner in which it has been conducted 
in their country." The artist seems to have 
thought that some of the Indians remained in 
their villages, because he joked about possibly 
stopping for a brief visit. He did not, and so the 
only Arikaras he met were a few who lived 
near the Mandan village where he had stayed 
and painted for a time. 48 
Whether all of the tribesmen had left the 
Missouri or not, for the next few years some 
Arikara bands lived with their relatives the 
Skidi Pawnees in Nebraska and sometimes 
farther west in present eastern Wyoming. By 
1836 at least a few groups of Arikaras began 
drifting back toward the Missouri. In Septem-
ber of that year a small party arrived at the 
Mandan village near Fort Clark in North Dakota 
and brought news that most of the rest of the 
tribe was then in the Black Hills. The fol-
lowing spring most of the other bands had 
moved back; by April, 1837, the fur trader 
Francis Chardon reported that about 250 
lodges-nearly the whole tribe-had arrived at 
the Mandan village. 49 
For the Arikaras, this move proved disas-
trous. By roaming on the plains they appar-
ently missed the recurring smallpox attacks that 
plagued the village tribes along the Missouri. 
In 1837, however, a major epidemic swept 
along the river destroying villagers and nomads 
alike, because passengers on the American Fur 
Company steamer St. Peter's carried the pesti-
lence to the villages and trading posts. The 
disease ran wild in the crowded villages, and 
within just a couple of months hundreds of 
Arikaras and Mandans died or fled. According 
to the resident fur trader Francis Chardon, 
nearly one-half of the Arikaras died by Sep-
tember, 1837. 50 This epidemic destroyed most 
of what remained of Arikara tribal, band, or 
village cohesion. Although the survivors con-
tinued to live near the Mandans in North 
Dakota, by the late 1830s they played a small 
role in the trade of the region. 
Few nineteenth-century Americans mourned 
the Arikara's virtual destruction in 1837. As 
far as the whites were concerned, the villagers 
deserved both their reputation as treacherous, 
hostile savages and their fate as well. What 
seems strange is that, although these people 
were never as great a threat to the traders as 
bands of the Teton Sioux, the Pawnees, or the 
Blackfeet, they served as a kind of focal point 
for white anger toward their Indian compe-
titors and partners in the fur and hide trade. 
Such views stemmed from many sources, but 
all developed because few fur traders or govern-
ment officials of that era could understand any 
Indians in nonethnocentric terms. Thus when 
the Arikaras attacked whites or even other 
tribesmen, the whites saw no rational patterns 
or explanations. Nevertheless, the villagers' 
action stemmed from a very real series of major 
problems and from assumptions and percep-
tions that differed fundamentally from those 
held by the traders. 
Whether the Arikaras saw their world crumb-
ling and considered their actions as part of a 
struggle for tribal or village survival is not clear. 
Yet in only a generation or two they had wit-
nessed a reduction from eighteen to only two 
villages by the 1820s. Following the advice of 
their own chiefs, the survivors disrupted pat-
terns of life, government, and military affairs 
in the remaining villages. At the same time, as 
their numbers were shrinking, their influence 
in the Indian trading patterns declined. Fre-
quently, neighboring Indians chose to raid their 
corn fields rather than pay for the food with 
meat and skins. The introduction of manu-
factured trade goods by white traders and the 
increasing numbers of American trappers who 
displaced or competed with Indian hunters and 
trappers further disrupted Arikara economic 
life. The spread of epidemic diseases, such as 
smallpox, and the occasional drought that 
destroyed the villagers' corn crops must have 
provided the final impetus for their hostile 
actions. 
All of these problems assailed other tribes 
along the Missouri and on the fringes of the 
plains, but only the Arikaras acquired such a 
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negative reputation. they were the only tribe in 
the region to fight openly with the United 
States before the middle of the nineteenth 
century. Their 1807 attack on the Nathaniel 
Pryor party laid a foundation for later charges 
that they were dangerous, although after that 
incident they treated most whites as friends. 
The 1823 fight with Ashley's trappers and the 
resulting Leavenworth campaign later that 
summer guaranteed that they would be consid-
ered unpredictable and treacherous. Because of 
Ashley's prominence as the former lieutenant 
governor of Missouri and as a well-known 
businessman from that state, the news of the 
Arikara attack spread across the nation, some-
thing that rarely happened when other Indians 
attacked traders or trappers in the West. 
Equally significant was the failure of the 
Leavenworth expedition to punish this tribe. 
When the army failed to defeat the Arikara 
villagers, many Missouri River traders raged 
that they would have to suffer the results of 
army incompetence for years. Joshua Pilcher, 
in particular, held that opinion. Because he 
sometimes served as an Indian agent for the 
upper Missouri tribes, his words received 
careful attention both in Washington and in the 
western press. He missed no opportunity to 
denounce the Arikaras. 
Still, it took more than the events of 1807 
and 1823 to give this tribe their bad reputation. 
Although there were frequent incidents of rob-
bery, beatings, and even occasional killings, 
the Arikaras' record includes nothing else that 
was unusual for Indian tribes at the time, so 
one must look elsewhere for sources of their 
bad name. In the 1830s many travelers visited 
the upper Missouri. Of these most praised the 
Mandans and by contrast denounced the Ari-
karas. George Catlin, who had little to say 
about the Arikaras, spoke for many when he 
wrote of "the kind and hospitable Mandans." 
He and many others suggested that these people 
might not have been Indians originally, and he 
heaped praise upon their society. These positive 
descriptions of their neighbors made the Ari-
karas seem particularly hostile by comparison. 
But a more important factor was the steady 
outpouring of anti-Arikara sentiment. Edwin 
Denig, writing during the mid-1830s, had 
nothing good to say about these people, and he 
denounced them continually.S1 With govern-
ment officials, the army, and fur traders all 
picturing this tribe in negative ways, it should 
not be difficult to understand why their bad 
reputation grew. Actually their record was 
little different from those of neighboring tribes 
except for the 1807 and 1823 incidents. Cer-
tainly these actions were more destructive and 
damaging to American influence and commerce 
on the Missouri than the frequent minor raids 
and robberies committed by all of the sur-
rounding tribes. Yet in both cases the Arikara 
attacks represented what the Indians consid-
ered a legitimate response to a perceived threat 
to their existence, not an irrational or "savage" 
action. It may be that even with these two 
attacks, the Arikaras deserved their negative 
reputation no more than some of their Indian 
neighbors. 
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